ADAMS, ROBERT. “Theories of actuality.”. Noûs, Vol. 8 (), pp. – CrossRef. CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI. “Individuation and. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.

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Actualism > An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For the remainder of this essay, then, we assume that some actualist theory of worlds is viable and therefore concentrate our energies solely on the problems that arise in connection possible individuals rather than possible worlds. This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A.

Reducing Possible Worlds to Language. Sign in Create an account.

Alvin Plantinga, Actualism and possible worlds – PhilPapers

In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism — i. One of the most popular solutions is to claim, as William Lycan and Robert Adams do, that “possible worlds” talk can be reduced to lossible relations amongst consistent and maximally complete sets of propositions.

Actualism and Possibilism in Metaphysics. On the Plurality aactualism Worlds. Here the “possible world” which is said to be actual is actual in virtue of all its elements being true of the world around us.

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Actualism and Possible Worlds

This invites the question whether there are cogent arguments for this assumption. Chad Carmichael – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 2: In putting forward this theory, the actualist takes herself to be replacing an obscure distinction between two modes of being — possible existence and actual worlxs — with an intelligible distinction.


Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other.

From an actualist point of view, such as Adams’possible worlds are nothing more than fictions created within the actual world.

The possibilist argues that apparent existential claims such as this that “there are” possible worlds of various sorts ought to be taken more or less at face value: I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects.

Find it on Scholar. More Like This Show all results sharing this subject: This leaves open the question, of course, of what an actually existing “way the world could be” is ; and on this question actualists are divided. Gabriel Uzquiano – – Philosophy Compass 10 4: Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. But, again, we will not pursue this question here. A world w is actual just in case w obtains.

A state of affairs w is a world just in case it is possible that w includes all and only states of affairs that obtain. Modal logic Ontology Metaphysical theories Possible worlds Analytic philosophy. This distinction is replaced by an allegedly clear distinction between two kinds of existing states of affairs — those that obtain and those that don’t. Therefore, as Lewis is happy to admit, there is a world where someone named Sherlock Holmes lived at b Baker Street in Victorian times, there is another world where pigs fly, and there is even another world where both Sherlock Holmes exists and pigs fly.


States of affairs, like propositions, are taken to be necessary beings on this account. Postulating objects with modal properties such as this seems less objectionable to the actualist than postulating objects with the modal properties described at the beginning of this paragraph. An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as modal realism was developed by the philosopher David Lewis.

If a state of affairs is possible, then it really obtains, it physically occurs in at least one world. Thus, as modal constructions, they come in as a handy heuristic device to use with modal logic; as it helps our modal reasoning to imagine ways the world might have been. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences.

If there are no Aliens, then no such world obtains. For the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, often called actualism, psosible Actual idealism. Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality Author s: