China–Myanmar relations - Wikipedia
Priscilla A. Clapp, senior advisor to the U.S. Institute of Peace, testifies before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on. China–Myanmar relations refers to the international relations between the People's Republic of China and Myanmar. China and Myanmar have active bilateral. A Journey from North China to Burma Through Tibetan Ssuch'uan and Yunnan to the conclusion that “Man - tzu et Lolos ne sont qu'une seule et meme race. a closer relationship between Burmese and Shans than can be proved to exist;.
Haplogroup D-M15 among the Tibetans as well as among the mainland East Asian populations that display very low frequencies of Haplogroup D-M Y-chromosomesHaplogroup D-M55 among the various populations of the Japanese Archipelago, Haplogroup D-P99 among the inhabitants of Tibet, Tajikistan and other parts of mountainous southern Central Asiaand paragroup D-M without tested positive subclades probably another monophyletic branch of Haplogroup D among the Andaman Islanders.
Haplogroup D is therefore very ancient, estimated atyears old. Haplogroup O, by contrast, is only about 30, years old. On the subject of Han genetics, Wikipedia states: The estimated contribution of northern Hans to southern Hans is substantial in both paternal and maternal lineages and a geographic cline exists for mtDNA.
As a result, the northern Hans are the primary contributors to the gene pool of the southern Hans. However, it is noteworthy that the expansion process was dominated by males, as is shown by a greater contribution to the Y-chromosome than the mtDNA from northern Hans to southern Hans.
These genetic observations are in line with historical records of continuous and large migratory waves of northern China inhabitants escaping warfare and famine, to southern China. They were enemy of the Shang dynastywho mounted expeditions against them, capturing slaves and victims for human sacrifice.Chinese's sing Myanmar song
Myanmar army to stop operations in north for more than 4 months 21 Dec Lim Chin Tsong was one of the few Chinese migrants to succeed in colonial-era Burma, now Myanmar — which the British incorporated into its much bigger possession, India, and where Chinese were subordinate to Indians, in contrast to their status in other Southeast Asian cities. Chin Tsong Palace was built in an eclectic mix of Chinese and European architectural styles, and an octagonal tower rising from its centre makes the mansion look like a Chinese pagoda.
The house is believed to have been modelled on the Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion in Penang, Malaysia, and is all that remains of the once fabulous fortune Lim, the son of a Chinese immigrant from Fujian province who moved to Yangon inamassed after setting up a trading firm.
The ministry will pay for restoration of the mansion, which is used by the State School of Fine Arts. Although we want a major renovation there are budget issues, so we might seek assistance in the future. He grew it into a small empire, comprising rice trading, rubber plantations, sugar refineries, mining, a fleet of steamers carrying passengers and freight from Rangoon to southern China and the Strait of Malacca, and a commission to act as sole agent for the Bombay Oil Company in the region.
He died in his sleep soon thereafter, inhaving been bankrupted by a British ban on rice exports and after having lost his Bombay Oil Company concession; some speculated he had committed suicide.
The British seized his mansion, and his creditors seized its furnishings, art collection and whatever else they could carry. Ethnic Chinese accounted for less than 3 per cent of the population of Burma ina figure that had increased to 8. Bythe Indian population of Rangoon exceeded one million, while the ethnic Chinese population was less thanAnother reason we are attacked over Rohingya issues is that we have a Muslim staff member. She has faced not just lies but abuse, much of it sexual in nature.
Aye Chan was incapable of having the discussion without repeatedly making personal attacks. The email conversation was forwarded to various email groups, and my in-box was flooded with abusive emails. When I asked Aye Chan to ask his supporters not to use personal abuse and threats, and to condemn those who do, he repeatedly refused to do so. When leaders not only fail to condemn abusive and personal attacks, but even make personal attacks themselves, their followers will copy their behaviour.
Previously imprisoned by the junta as a dissident, he is now welcome because his scholarship and advocacy provide a veneer of legitimacy to anti-Rohingya sentiment. In September, he attended a conference on "National Identity and Citizenship in 21st Century Myanmar" in Yangon and was pointedly greeted at the airport by an Arakanese delegation.
According to the Arakanese news agency: Arakanese were said to have held placards and banners that included one which read "Dr Aye Chan, Save the Land of Arakan" while welcoming him at the airport. The evidence is overwhelming that anti-Rohingya sentiment permeates the warp and weft of Burmese society and dominates both government and anti-government institutions at local and national levels.
Aung San Suu Kyi is obviously uncomfortable pushing back against this bigotry, perhaps because of shared religious values she abandoned the clear eyed multi-ethnic socialist politics of her late father for an airy brand of Buddhism during her incarceration and because the support of Buddhist monks significantly leverages her political power and reach inside Burma.
But the savage pogroms of this year beg the question Why Now? The answer may be found in by understanding the dynamics behind pogroms- the carnivals of violence against despised minorities that, in Western literature, are most closely associated with the persecution of Jews in Europe. A detailed analysis of the anti-Jewish pogrom in Odessa in concluded it did not ignite "spontaneously".
It was orchestrated- and its excesses were condoned or encouraged in a time of significant political flux and heightened anxiety a society preconditioned towards violence against Jews.
In Odessa, the political disorder attending reforms promulgated by Tsar Nicholas was blamed on Jewish agitation, and a pogrom incited among the impoverished and enthusiastically anti-Semitic populace in order to advance a particular political agenda. A Case Study" in Pogroms: How then are we to explain the outbreak of the pogrom? Okhrana [secret police] chief Bobrov, for example, concluded that Jews were responsible for provoking pogromist attacks because they were spearheading a revolutionary attack on the autocracy in an effort to establish their "own tsardom.
Then they'll know what freedom is. Certainly this is a period of significant political flux in Myanmar. Eager to shed the Chinese incubus and attract Western interest and investment, the Myanmar regime has opted for reconciliation with pro-democracy forces, a pro-Western tilt, and elections for parliament in It has been suggested that Aung San Suu Kyi's unwillingness to stand up for the Rohingya reflects a calculation that her standing among the bigoted Burmese electorate will suffer if she sympathizes with the despised minority.
However, her immense reserves of political capital inside Myanmar argue that she could retain her standing and reputation despite a statement on behalf of the Rohingya. Her dogged refusal to yield on the issue - even as her international reputation takes a hit - suggests that narrower, more tactical political considerations may be driving her response.
In a development that has considerable bearing on the Rohingya issue, democratic reforms have given rise to a plethora of local-chauvinist party in the ethnic borderlands of Burma. The non-Rohingya people of Rakhine State who prefer to call themselves Arakanese are a distinct, Buddhist ethnic minority of Burma, with a contentious history of demands for autonomy, federalism, or even independence from Yangyon. The party of Arakan chauvinism, the RNDP did very well in both the local elections and the general election for seats in the national parliament reserved for Arakanese both from the state and from the Arakanese diaspora in Mandalay.
A party official described the USDP's hamfisted idea of outreach: Some local villagers are saying they will lodge a complaint against Maung Oo for the sale of cooperative society-owned land while he was serving as a regional commander in Rakhine State.
The People Who Went Down the Rivers: Origin of the Sino-Tibetan Language Family
Do you know anything about this? Yes, we know about it. This case happened in Kyaukpyu Township in Gonechein village. He looted this land while he was a regional commander here and his soldiers guarded the land. We heard that the local villagers tried to prosecute him. The people are aware and enlightened now. A regional commander can no longer do whatever he wants.
By their sending a man like Maung Oo here, our Rakhine party profited. Now the USDP has a hard time getting support here. Our Rakhine people are happy because of their mistake because it made our party more popular. Even if we do don't do anything, the Rakhine people will not support our rival party.
Since the Chairman of the RNDP, Ayu Maung appears to have made the solution of Rakhine's Rohingya problem his first priority, perhaps the USDP calculates that, by giving a tacit green light, moral support, and propaganda and diplomatic cover from the central government to the RNDP-sponsored pogrom of the Rohingya, the foundation is being laid for a strategic alliance that will counter the NLD post However, even if the RNDP and the USDP bond over a shared commitment to human rights violations, this is not a marriage made in political heaven- not without a little financial midwifing, anyway.
An inevitable by-product of political reform is overturning the previous policy of crude exploitation and malign neglect which characterized the junta's dealings with the border minority areas.
China Matters: Burma Washes Its Hands of the Rohingyas
The forestry, gemstone, and energy treasures of the borderlands were extensively if inefficiently looted by the officers of the junta, primarily to China's benefit. Now, it is time for the USDP to woo these ripped-off minorities. Beyond the atavistic gratification of the occasional pogrom, the key issue at stake is resource sharing or what might be called "resource provincialism.
Senior minister Soe Thein said President Thein Sein's government was all for providing greater autonomy to ethnic states, where armed conflicts had raged for years, particularly under the previous military junta rule. Ethnic groups have long been excluded from Burma's politics during decades of brutal military rule which came to an end in March when Thein Sein's nominally civilian government took over. Parliament is at present considering a proposal to change rules in the appendix to the country's military-written constitution to allocate a percentage of revenue from natural resources to each of the country's states and divisions.
The proposal was made by a head of the ethnic Rakhine Nationalities Development Party. When completed, probably intwinned natural gas and crude oil pipelines the gas pipeline carrying Shwe gas, the oil pipeline to carry Middle Eastern petroleum will cross Rakhine Province, the Shan state, and into China's Yunnan Province, to drive the economic development of China's southwest and, ostensibly, remove the threat of interdiction of Chinese oil shipments in the Straits of Malacca.
That's a nice income for Rakhine, whose total population is around 4 million people 3 million if the Rohingya aren't counted - half of whom live below the poverty line. The Minister also frankly discussed the political dimension: Soe Thein, who is a minister in Thein Sein's office, said that ethnic-based parties should not be ignored in the national agenda.
The People Who Went Down the Rivers: Origin of the Sino-Tibetan Language Family | evolutionistx
Of course, teak, gemstones, and opium are interesting business opportunities; but the low-lying fruit for which Western oil companies are panting is easily-accessible offshore energy resources in Rakhine. If the USDP could orchestrate it, a generous revenue-sharing arrangement with the Arakanese and the Mon, Kachin, and Chin would relieve the USDP and China of their isolation in parliament and buck the generally pro-Western political, diplomatic, and economic trend inside Myanmar.
So it is tempting to speculate that her marked unwillingness to criticize the Rohingya pogroms reflects her understanding that criticism of the human rights failings of Rakhine State would endanger her alliance with the Rakhine bloc in parliament - a bloc, moreover, that will wield disproportionate clout if and when it gets access to revenue sharing from the offshore oil and gas fields. MOGE is notorious for parking royalty payments in overseas accounts instead of repatriating them back into Burma, and acting as an unaccountable piggy bank for the military.
In an interesting illustration of what happens when democracy and Western business interests collide, the Obama administration carefully finessed her concerns when it lifted sanctions so that US oil companies could charge toward the Burmese trough subject to some special MOGE-related reporting requirements that appear rather pro-forma.
Perhaps her remark was meant to encourage Rakhine State to agitate for its own oil company, thereby starving MOGE and the army of fresh cash, and, to China's dismay, also depriving the USDP of the economic and political leverage in Rakhine created by alliance between MOGE and foreign bidders.