With the emergence of massive information networks, graph data have become Since such techniques require the understanding of relationships between involving user's direct and indirect neighborhood associations. dyadic relation to C but also may have an indirect relation to C through B. and triad closure– recently employing exponential-family random graph models. The evolution of internation relationships is studied by means of a made in static, graph theoretic studies of the balancing of relationships within individuals, . an addition of another entity but an introduction of an indirect relationship ().
In the extreme, a pure world of second-degenerate signs would approximate to, for example, a stream of consciousness made up of a montage of images, feelings, and sounds: Note that first-degenerate Thirdness itself can undergo continuous partial decomposition into second-degeneracy; thus, a sign can embody a mixture of genuine Thirdness, first-degenerate Thirdness, and second-degenerate Thirdness in various proportions.
Firstness and Thirdness can be more or less vague; Secondness alone is always precise. Given two flowers seen a minute apart, how close is the redness of the first flower to the redness of the second?
One may be able to form a fairly good offhand judgment-- but in terms of 1o alone it will not be altogether precise. Thus the redness of either flower has a penumbra of vagueness to it. Likewise, Thirdness is more or less vague as meaning must be at least slightly indefinite in order to function at all cf.
For example, the word "chair" is of the nature of a general law, instantiated in each object which is capable of being appropriately termed a "chair. And the same holds true of any more complex sign, be it a statement, an argument, a ritual, a belief system, a human being, or the wide world itself. Indeed, the more common or important a sign, the more vague it will tend to be. Thus, as Peirce often remarks cf.
This vagueness is not to be confused with the inchoate: The human being as a sign stripped of all vagueness would be, under a Peircean view, no longer a sign, but a mere algorithm: The intensity of Firstness can vary since a quality of feeling may be experienced at varying levels of consciousness or attention-- though of course one can compare such instances of Firstness and judge them of different intensities only through Secondness and Thirdness 1.
Likewise degenerate Secondness, as a congeries of monads, may vary in intensity 2. And the intensity of Thirdness may vary as the representamen has only one "degree of freedom" in its relationship to object and interpretant, and so is relatively a First cf.
Important here also is the hierarchical nature of the categories. Secondness may be conceived apart from explicit attention to Thirdness, and Firstness apart from conscious supposition of either Secondness or Thirdness, but Secondness only manifests itself through Thirdness, and Firstness only through Secondness and Thirdness 1.
What is indirect relationship? definition and meaning - zolyblog.info
Thus, "though it is easy to distinguish the three categories from one another, it is extremely difficult accurately and sharply to distinguish each from other conceptions so as to hold it in its purity and yet in its full meaning.
His division of signs begins by considering which of the three categories predominates in the sign representamen itself; in the sign-object relationship; and in the sign-interpretant relationship. According to the first trichotomy, if Firstness predominates in the representamen, we have a Qualisign, "a [potential] quality which is a Sign"; if Secondness, a Sinsign, "an actual existent thing or event which is a sign"; if Thirdness, a Legisign, "a law that is a sign," whether conventional or natural, and that acts through individual instantiations hence Sinsigns called Replicas 2.
According to the second trichotomy, if Firstness is most prominent in the sign-object relationship, the sign is an Icon, which denotes by qualitative resemblance 2.
According to the third trichotomy, a sign-interpretant relationship characterized chiefly by Firstness is a Rheme or Term; by Secondness, a Dicisign or Proposition; by Thirdness, an Argument 2. Under each trichotomy, a sign may be of not just a single type, but of two or all three types in varying degree 2. And Peirce combines his three trichotomies to yield ten classes of signs according to the following diagram 2. The boundaries are, again, approximations cf.
Object, representamen, and interpretant are what they are only in the context of their sign relationship. But within this context as the division of signs indicates the representamen is what it is of the three most nearly independently of the other two-- that is, functions most nearly as a First-- while the interpretant is the most complex, most nearly determined as a Third by object and representamen; and the object is of intermediate complexity, occurring either itself as an instance of Secondness or determined dyadically by precisely one of the other two 2.
The interpretant subdivides into immediate, dynamical, and final interpretant; the object into immediate and dynamical object.
The immediate object is the qualitative object as immediately presented to interpretant by sign: The immediate interpretant is the potential interpretant as immediately presented by the sign; the dynamical interpretant, the interpretant as it actually "shakes down" in process to determine an effect or habit-change; the final interpretant, the interpretant as it would finally turn out in the community of interpretation in an infinite long-run.
Peirce's teleology grows out of this division of the interpretant 4. It should now be very clear that triads and trichotomies form the warp and woof of Peirce's approach to semiotics.
The debate over this triadicity has taken two divergent and incompatible avenues: But Where Is the Fourth? Mertz's proposal is the most easily disposed of. He examines Peirce's argument for the irreducibility of triads, as illustrated in "A Guess at the Riddle": Indeed, the very idea of a combination involves that of thirdness, for a combination is something which is what it is owing to the parts which it brings into mutual relationship. From another angle, Mertz states that no two of the triadic relations "1 A sells C to B, 2 C is sold to B for D, and 3 A sells C to D" can be conjoined to arrive at the original tetradic relationship.
It is neither here nor there, but puzzling: Mertz concludes that Peirce was blinded to such arguments by his fascination with logical diagrams which Peirce named "existential graphs.
In his first argument, Mertz is attempting to join a dyad with a triad without identifying which of the elements in the dyad is being joined to the triad. His second argument involves joining two triads by joining two elements in one with two elements in another. The former procedure has no precedent in Peirce, and the latter under Peirce's methods ought to yield a dyad, not a tetrad as Mertz thinks Peirce would have expected.
Since Mertz gives us no clue as to how his procedures relate to those of Peirce, we have no way of judging whether Mertz is doing anything really entailed by Peirce's project, or whether Mertz is simply arriving at different conclusions because he is working out of different assumptions. Schneider concedes three categories to be adequate for dealing with cognitive processes, but argues for "importance" as a category of Fourthness. He notes that, for Peirce, any purpose or good has meaning only in relation to a completely general summum bonum.
Such norms he proposes as a phenomenological aspect of Fourthness: Satisfaction may comprise either the Thirdness of achievement or the Fourthness of satiety or contentment. The moral self-control of Thirdness in pursuit of an abstract summum bonum is only an abstract "intellectual framework" until it is taken up into the "concrete universal" of the moral self-criticism of Fourthness. Fourthness supplies what depth psychology, but not the Kantian "moral law within," acknowledges.
Triadic semiosis is "prospective and cumulative"; tetradic semiosis adds a fourth factor which is non-cumulative, but "retrospective" along the hierarchy of categories, giving "meaningful individuality" to instances of Firstness.
Since Firstness and Secondness "look 'forward'" to Thirdness while Fourthness "looks back" to Firstness, Thirdness in a sense "governs" Fourthness while Fourthness provides the steam to "drive" Thirdness.
Hausman notes that Schneider's suggestion rejects "Peirce's own principle that a highest good makes specific goods intelligible," but that, quite regardless of this, Schneider puts a finger both on the problematic status of value in Peirce's semiotic and on an apparent "special connection" between value and Firstness. Peirce categorially divided philosophy into phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics, and normative science into aesthetics, ethics, and logic 1.
Just as normative science rests on phenomenology and on the prior field of mathematics within which two fields Peirce constructed his categoriesso the categorial hierarchy is reflected in an order of dependence in which "ethics rest[s] on aesthetics, and logic on ethics," all three but especially aesthetics dependent on phenomenology.
Rather, it seems related but not identical to the teleological thrust built into Peirce Thirdness, and bound up with the categorial hierarchy. We can prescind Firstness and Secondness from value, but neither value nor Thirdness from each other. Hausman speculates that value and Thirdness could be separated by "discrimination," "so interdependent that they are co-present as mutual grounds for one another," though this is difficult to determine since Peirce is none too clear as to what he meant by the term.
As Peirce himself was aware, as a natural scientist he devoted more attention to logic and less to ethics and aesthetics 2. But I would concede Schneider's point that Peirce's account, as it stands, does justice better to the apollonian than to the dionysian side of human existence. However Peirce, especially in his explorations of phenomenological Firstness cf. And a sequence of monads co-present with the semiotic "time line" which present themselves immediately and spontaneously in the interpretation of the sign ought to suggest a factor of the Peircean sign already familiar to us: Although Peirce is not explicit, the logical and phenomenological characteristics which Schneider attributes to Fourthness all fit well the spot the immediate interpretant occupies in Peirce's semiotic.
By its relation to dynamical and final interpretant, the immediate interpretant is certainly "related but not identical" to the teleological thrust of Thirdness. And energetic immediate interpretants would "give a meaningful individuality" to Firstness.
Finally, if Hausman's interpretation of "discrimination" is correct, then the immediate unlike the dynamical or final interpretant would indeed be related to the sign by discrimination. Vaught points out that, phenomenologically, there is a similarity between things such as a left hand and a right hand which does not seem reducible to a combination of identity and difference.
According to Peirce, most spatial relationships can be dealt with predominantly in terms of the Secondness of objects in dynamic interaction or relative location.
Yet as Vaught notes, Peirce vacillated over whether right and left can be distinguished in terms of Secondness-- for example, indexically 2. Thus, your right hand is that hand which is toward the east, when you face north with your head toward the zenith.
Three things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference between right and left. Right and left, Vaught concludes, embody a similarity irreducible to identity and difference.
Thus, a four-term analogical relation would be reducible to a combination of simpler terms. But Vaught argues that just such irreducible analogical tetrads occur in Peircean semiosis. Within the vagueness inherent in Peircean semiosis then, says Vaught, lies precisely a similarity, irreducible to identity and difference, which embraces interpretant at t1, interpretant at t2, dynamical object at t1, and dynamical object at t2 in a tetradic analogical relationship which due to the vagueness is not precisely reducible to any combination of triads.
As an example of this, consider a legisign which grows and develops over time: Likewise, the similarity between right and left can be seen only through a judgment of analogy. If similarity is not to be understood as Peirce saw it as reducible to some combination of univocity and equivocity, then Vaught's argument is probably correct. But I think counter-arguments can be mounted on both logical and phenomenological fronts. Logically, if the sequence of interpretants in Vaught's argument on analogy are considered, not as a sequence of discrete frames in a movie film as Vaught takes thembut rather as a genuinely continuous flow of interpretants and likewise the flow of dynamical objects continuousthen the need for the four-term relationship vanishes and Thirdness suffices.
The situation becomes logically similar to, and no more problematic than, an account of a continuous function in differential calculus. On the phenomenological front, I note that mathematicians define the "orientation" or handedness of a space by dyadic and triadic arguments alone. The proof is rather technical, but it enables one to speak of left- or right-handedness in space of three dimensions, or even more without resort to any tetradic combinations and without any prior invocation of right or left.
In a symposium on this book in the Transactions of the Charles S. In a later article Vincent Colapietro attempts an evaluation of an positive response to Greenlee's project. But Greenlee finds problematic an important aspect of Peirce's sign: Peirce thinks of the sign as something which always points away from itself to an object. I go along with the idea that a sign always points away from itself.
But I think it is a mistake to suppose that the pointing must always be to something referred to What the sign always points to is that which interprets it-- what Peirce calls its 'interpretant. For what does mathematics refer to?
What is the object of logical connectives such as the conjunction "and"? The object of verbal commands? The latter is a class that includes much of everyday human behavior. If we try to say that "the meaning of a word is what it stands for," this collides with the "pragmatic maxim," bound up with the teleology of Peirce's final interpretant, that meaning "lies in the future," 42 since it would imply that all propositions, even those "about the past, are really about the future.
Looking at Peirce's application of signs to human thought, Greenlee observes that Peirce's rejection of "mental-material dualism" suggests an equivalence between thought-signs and signs in general; that Peirce's distinction between actual and habitual notions cf.
For, argues Greenlee, Peirce's immediate object can carry all the freight that a sign characterized by abstraction requires its object to bear.
When the sign is representative, the dynamical object may obtain; when not, then rather than construing as dynamical object the context in which the immediate object was expected 8. In either case, the immediate object can be interpreted in terms of direct or indirect "past experience as relevant to the interpretation of the present sign.
The entire semiotic process is collapsed down into the temporal continuum of signs and interpretants.Indirect and Direct Relationships
The sign process may be considered as polyadic if we include each previous sign relevant to the interpretation of the present sign, but fundamentally the sign is now dyadic: Instead of insisting on triadicity, Peirce's semiotic should have insisted a simply on a differentiation of the sign from the dyadic causal relationship and b on the continuity of interpretation. This same formal definition construes continuity as continuity of interpretation, since every interpretant of a sign calls for a further interpretation of itself.
In the potential of such continuing interpretation for establishing habitual rules of interpretation Greenlee locates the meaning of his dyadic sign, though under such a revision the final interpretant must become "actual rather than ideal," provisional and not "destinate.
The icon becomes a sign of "exhibitive import," displaying to its interpretant qualities and properties familiar from experience. Peirce's semiotic is not about a class of objects.
It is about what it is to be an object. But, note Ransdell and Fitzgerald, for Peirce the dynamical object had priority as that over against which sign and interpretant stand; a closer logical analysis is necessary to bring out "something internal to the sign which relates it to the thing or circumstances"; and Peirce saw imaginative or fictive semiosis, in which the focus is upon the immediate object, "as logically more complex than as 'parasitical' upon semiosis involving a real object.
I take it this is what Ransdell is hinting at when he calls Greenlee's proposal "a semiotic of 'absolute' idealism. For Peirce, note Brock and Ransdell, all semiosis is dialogical, the original model for object-sign-interpretant being the utterer-utterance-interpreter structure of human communication. But since Peirce early rejected Cartesian intuition and Kantian synthetic a prioris, he abstracted not generalized, as does Greenlee features of this process to allow for the entry into the sign-interpretant continuum of quasi-dialogical factors neither derivable from nor reducible to sign-interpretant processes alone, hence irreducible Third.
Thus in Peirce's view, says Ransdell, "The ultimate utterer of all signs-- all interpretive phenomena-- is reality itself. No such questions and no such answers can be found in Professor Greenlee's book. To this degree, Greenlee has a point. This relationship can be made more specific in terms of the again purely formal division of signs, division of object into immediate or dynamical object, etc.
As we have seen, Greenlee misses the logical or formal aspect since he does not deal with inference, and since his emphasis on meaning seems to lead him toward a sort of psychologism witness his attempted distinction between significative and causative dyads. Colapietro responds to specific objections by arguing that a word such as "and" can be seen as an index of relatively low intensity; 59 music, as a sign of the composer's "musical ideas," which are qualities of feeling 5.
The fact that all signs have dynamic objects and, hence, external constraints makes semiosis a fallible process: Commands and notes of music, no less than paradigmatic cases of representational semiosis, involve such a possibility, precisely because they could be constrained by something outside of themselves. Two themes recur in the Fourthness arguments. One revolves around the understanding of continuity as it appears in Thirdness; the other involves areas in which one could wish Peirce had written more fully, or more clearly.
Schneider's Fourthness constitutes a discontinuous sequence riding "piggyback" on the continuity of Thirdness.
Hausman manages to find a place for value as a factor in Thirdness, but this value remains an event-by-event, case-by-case affair. Vaught locates the analogical tetrad in the minute interstices of the flow of semiosis. Although as I have argued with Vaught a proper understanding of continuity goes a long way toward clarifying matters Peircean, it seems that in each instance these writers are striving for a structure intermediate between pure continuity and total disconnection, a structure which exhibits features of both.
But, as I have argued in my exposition of Peirce, we already have precisely such a structure in the interplay within the sign of genuine Thirdness and the two degrees of degenerate Thirdness.
Vaught detects genuine vacillations and inconsistencies in Peirce's thought on analogy and on the similarity of certain spatial structures. And Schneider points out correctly that Peirce skews his account somewhat away from the dark, mysterious, irrational forces of the psyche which twentieth-century psychologists have made us take into account.
I think all these are valid areas for further Peircean inquiry. And certainly there is no end to the tangled inconsistencies in Peirce! By the approximativeness of Peirce's own semiotic, a category of Fourthness may well emerge, but we could find this out only through such further inquiry.
I think I have answered the proposals so far put forth, though I find it suggestive that they all hint at some sort of coincidentio oppositorum in which incommensurables can be reconciled, and the two potentially vague categories can precipitate out concretely without sacrificing spontaneity or becoming locked into the precision of Secondness. In such a direction, if any, I would suggest future Fourthness-hunters look. Peirce may seldom have spoken of anything like Schneider's "depth psychology," but one cannot read much of Peirce without being struck starkly by uncanny bass resonances in his tone of thought, like peals of distant thunder.
It is this trait that so confounds some Peirce scholars who find him talking one moment like a hard-headed empiricist and the next like a New England transcendentalist mystic.
It is clear that between Greenlee and Peirce there lies the chasm of a fundamental philosophical option. It is the choice which Peirce summed up by contrasting his own stance of "realism" with the several shades of what he called "nominalism.
What is the scope of our semiotic-- everything humanly understood and experienced so that the world of real signs equals the sum total of the actualor everything humanly understandable and experienceable so that the world of actual signs instantiates a broader continuum of the real?
These are the kinds of fundamental options which may be fruitfully discussed, but which we more often bring to than derive from the conversation. I think Colapietro puts it well when he says that what is at stake here is that, under the dyadic option, it is we who initiate the process of semiosis by taking up some stance toward a complex.
In contrast, an implication of [the triadic option] is that, at least in some cases, we are not the initiators of but the respondents to a world which is always already meaningful to some degree. I have striven here more for lucid brevity than for anything like precision.
For precision please consult the body of the paper! A sign which as its name suggests embodies a logical argument.
A factor present in some way, shape, or form in every conceivable phenomenon; in some phenomena, one of the categories may be predominant. See Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.
Triadic analysis of the southern women datasets • bitriad
The "chain" of degrees by which relative existence approaches closer and closer to actual individual existence.
Each "link" is one type of degenerate Secondness. A dyad partially decomposed into a pair of monads: Degenerate Thirdness, First Degree of: A sign more or less decomposed into a mere collection of dyads or brute facts. A sign more or less decomposed into a mere montage of monads or qualities. A sign which conveys a statement or piece of information. Also called proposition, pheme.
But these categories, especially the last, ignore higher-order structure in the original affiliation network. The higher-order structure of interest consists of three actors at a time and any events from which connections among them; this is the basis for the full affiliation network triad census. The rows reflect the distribution of exclusive events, and the columns indicate the number of inclusive events; for instance, Miss A and Miss B attended two events movies and dance without Miss C, and Miss A and Miss C attended one event bridge without Miss B, while Miss B and Miss C attended no events together.
As networks grow, this scheme quickly becomes ridiculous. There are, however, intermediate schemes that capture valuable information that is lost to the simple census. Consider the binary triad census, which collapses duplicate events and replaces the counts above with binary indicators of the existence of each type of event: The simple triad census can be recovered from both of these higher-order censuses: Every triad of three edges counts thrice as a closed wedge, while every two-edged triad constitutes a single open wedge.
We can therefore compute a clustering coefficient from a simple triad census: The paper accompanying this package Brunson, discusses in detail two alternative measures specifically designed for affiliation networks.
The first measure of triadic closure specific to affiliation networks, ignoring previous bipartite clustering coefficients that were not based on triples of actors, was proposed by Opsahl The second is dubbed the exclusive clustering coefficient because it depends only on the exclusive events any triad.
Both of these diagnostics are recoverable from the full triad census: Local triad closure So far we have only measured triadic closure network-wide; that is, we have been looking at global properties. But triadic analysis has always taken place at the interface between micro and macro. Having viewed the southern women through this global lens, we now turn to the local.
From the image above we can see that the only pair of women not linked through at least one event are Miss B and Miss C.
Triadic analysis of the southern women datasets
B and C among their neighobrs, i. It is this function that determines the measure of triadic closure to be calculated. The three local clustering coefficients provide an illustrative comparison: Wedge-dependent triad closure One thoroughly documented property of social networks is the inverse relationship between local connectivity and local triad closure Briefly, actors that are directly connected to more other actors tend to have smaller clustering coefficients.