Notably, few studies have linked motivation to mental health. Such a climate has either no association with adaptive outcomes or an association . The protocol was approved by the University Ethics Committee, and all participants .. Evidently, it is important for coaches, parents, et cetera to consider the. theology into her own ethical theory: Divine Motivation theory (DM). Zagzebski's goal in the relationship between God and his creation. DM is a prescriptive, and therefore does not seem to fit the criterion of an ethical theory at all. Even . Zagzebski evidently believes that some kind of virtue ethic has the best chance of . If we are to explain moral motivation, we will need to understand not only . According to existence internalism, a necessary connection exists Talk about morality is, Mackie evidently thinks, rather like talk about unicorns.
Integrated regulation had a negative association with anxiety, and intrinsic regulation had a positive association with depressive symptoms. These findings highlight the complexities of and interrelations between motivation and mental health among athletes, and support the importance of considering mental health as an outcome of motivation.
Introduction Motivation is a key determinant of behavior in sport. It is a complex construct, with athletes having diverse and dynamic motives for initiating, directing, sustaining, and terminating effort.
Athletes can be motivated by internal or external factors, or a combination of both, which may vary by context and time.
Due to the longstanding and widespread interest in motivation, researchers have developed theories, evaluated social-environmental factors, identified universal antecedents, and studied other related variables in an effort to understand motivation. The current study contributes to this vast body of work and provides practical applications for elite athletes by encompassing all of these areas within the framework of the Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation HMIEM.
SDT posits the existence of different motivational types that lie along a continuum from most to least self-determined; that is, from intrinsic motivation to extrinsic motivation to amotivation Deci and Ryan, Self-determined motivation involves performing an action out of choice, rather than out of external obligation or internal pressure. Intrinsic motivation is the most self-determined form of motivation, and refers to doing an activity for the pleasure and satisfaction derived from participation.
Extrinsic motivation encompasses behaviors that are linked to a separable outcome, and comprises four behavioral regulations: Overall, autonomous motivation incorporates actions that athletes undertake volitionally, and, therefore, comprises intrinsic motivation, integrated regulation, and identified regulation. In contrast, controlled motivation involves intra- or inter-personal coercion, and therefore, includes introjected and external regulations.
Amotivation lies at the least self-determined end of the motivational continuum, and is defined as a lack of intention of act. The HMIEM provides a framework for understanding the determinants and consequences of motivation at the global personalitycontextual life domainand situational state levels Vallerand, Specifically, it posits that the degree to which basic psychological needs are satisfied by social-environmental factors influences the degree to which motivation is considered self-determined, which then leads to affective, cognitive, or behavioral consequences Vallerand, Of particular interest in the current study is the aforementioned motivational sequence at the contextual level because contextual motivation includes an individual's motivational behavior in a particular life domain e.
Overall, substantial cross-sectional e. Determinants of Motivation Social-environmental factors are collectively called the motivational climate Ames,and are innumerable in the sport context e.
This dichotomy emerged from Achievement Goal Theory Nicholls,and is the most common conceptualization of motivational climate in sport research Lindahl et al. A task climate is associated with adaptive more positive outcomes, such as increased competence, intrinsic motivation, and positive affect, whereas an ego climate is associated with maladaptive more negative outcomes, such as extrinsic motivation, amotivation, and negative affect Harwood et al.
The motivational climate influences motivation through its impact on the basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness Vallerand, Competence is the belief that an individual can successfully accomplish a task, autonomy involves freely choosing an action that aligns with an individual's values, and relatedness entails having a connectedness with others.
In a task motivational climate, the coach tends to convey trust in athletes' abilities competence supportoffer choices autonomy supportand consider the athletes' perspectives relatedness supportwhich facilitates need satisfaction and leads to self-determined motivation and other adaptive experiences.
In an ego motivational climate, however, the coach often uses control and pressure to influence behavior, which do not support basic psychological needs or self-determined motivation. Such a climate has either no association with adaptive outcomes or an association with maladaptive outcomes Harwood et al.
Consequences of Motivation Much evidence points to the associations between motivation and important outcomes across a range of life domains. For example, motivation is related to interest and dropout intentions in education Gillet et al.
According to SDT, the more self-determined the motivation, the more positive the consequences Vallerand, In sport, there is support for the link between self-determined motivation and a range of outcomes, such as objective performance Gillet et al. Associations between motivation and mental health are supported by early work in SDT Deci and Ryan,and continue to be of interest in sport e. There has been a recent upsurge in mainstream interest in athlete mental health, particularly at the elite level Uphill et al.
When such variables are undermined, an athlete may experience poor mental health in the form of depressed mood and disturbed sleep, as examples. On the one hand, elite athletes occupy a privileged position in society and, arguably, experience heightened pressure on and off the field.
On the other hand, however, they may also be more resilient to poor mental health due to the coping strategies honed by their demanding lifestyles.
Either way, sport involvement does not imply immunity from poor mental health, and SDT may provide insights into this important outcome.
Associations between motivation and mental health have been found in studies that consider the full sequence e. In some investigations, mental health is conceptualized as a single outcome e. Overall, the evidence suggests that mental health can play a role in the aforementioned four-part motivational sequence, and that assessing numerous mental health variables, as in the current study, may provide greater insight than assessing them in isolation or conceptualizing them as a single outcome.
Motivation and Mental Health The literature indicates that anxiety, poor mood, depression, and disturbed sleep persist in elite sport, and are of interest to most stakeholders because they can impair performance.The Most Motivational Talk EVER! - David Goggins - DRIVEN -
Woodman and Hardy reported a significant negative association between anxiety and competitive performance, while Abrahamsen and Pensgaard found that decreasing perceptions of a task motivational climate were related to more performance worries.
According to existence internalism, a necessary connection exists between having a certain normative status and motivation. Consider a view about reasons associated most prominently with Bernard Williams According to what is called internalism about reasons or reasons internalism, necessarily, if an individual has a reason to do an action, he must be able to be motivated to do that action.
According to Mackie, the motivating power of objective values, if there were such values, would have to be just as Plato depicted it. So moral cognitivism—the view that moral judgments and beliefs, and the sentences that express them, can be true or false—provides the correct account of moral semantics, of what our moral judgments mean.
Given that our moral discourse is cognitivist, it would seem to presume the correctness of moral realism, the view, roughly, that moral judgments and beliefs are truth evaluable, and some of them are literally true.
Talk about morality is, Mackie evidently thinks, rather like talk about unicorns. But there are no such creatures, and so our unicorn talk is systematically in error, though few of us any longer succumb to the error. In denying the existence of moral properties, Mackie rejects moral realism, combining a cognitivist moral semantics with an error theory.
And most have rejected efforts to explain moral motivation by appealing to a motivating power emanating from moral properties and the acts and states of affairs that instantiate them.
One partial exception to this last claim may be worth noting. Christine Korsgaard has endorsed the idea of something like objectively prescriptive entities, though these entities are not, in her view, moral properties. Whether or not there are any properties or entities with anything like the powers Mackie describes, it is a mistake to suppose that moral realists and objectivists must be committed to their existence.
No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts.
Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them.
Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated.
As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification alluded to earlier that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.
Moral Judgment and Motivation Philosophers have most often attempted to explain moral motivation not by appealing to the special powers of moral properties but by appealing to the nature of moral judgments. Perhaps moral judgments are such that no person could sincerely judge an act morally right or a state of affairs good, while remaining wholly unmoved. Efforts to understand moral motivation in terms of motivation by moral judgments must confront two central questions. First, what is the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation—do moral judgments motivate necessarily or do they motivate only contingently?
Second, can moral judgments motivate on their own or can they motivate only by the intermediation of a desire or other conative state? Of course, philosophers have answered these questions in varying ways. Now one way in which moral judgments could motivate, and, indeed, motivate on their own, would be if moral judgments were not representational after all.
Suppose moral judgments did not ascribe properties and express moral beliefs about what things have those properties. They simply express a motivating state that the individual already has; to make a sincere moral judgment is already to be motivated, at least to some degree. The real puzzle as to how moral judgments can motivate arises for those who maintain that moral judgments express moral beliefs, for the connection between belief, a cognitive state, and motivation is uncertain.
How philosophers resolve the puzzle turns on a central issue in moral psychology, namely, whether what is called the Humean theory of motivation is true. According to the Humean view, belief is insufficient for motivation, which always requires, in addition to belief, the presence of a desire or conative state.
Moral motivation thus cannot arise from moral belief alone but must depend as well upon a preexisting desire or other conative or intrinsically motivating state. It would perhaps be fair to say that Humeanism continues to be the dominant view.
It has been held both by some who accept and by some who reject cognitivism and moral realism, so it has not alone been considered decisive in settling broader issues in metaethics.
The view has been held by noncognitivist anti-realists, for example, but also by moral realists like Michael Smith and Peter Railton a. A number of prominent philosophers, including Thomas NagelJohn McDowellMark PlattsDavid McNaughtonJonathan DancyThomas Scanlonand Russ Shafer-Landauhave rejected the Humean picture, however, arguing that, in fact, moral motivation does not depend on the existence of desire: Precisely how and under what conditions moral belief can itself motivate is a matter of dispute among anti-Humeans.
Some hold that moral belief is sufficient to motivate directly. Merely believing that it is right, say, to keep a promise will move the believer, at least to some degree, to act so as to keep the promise.
Others hold that moral beliefs produce desires, which then motivate in conjunction with the moral beliefs that produced them.
Believing that it is right to keep a promise produces a desire to do so, and these cognitive and conative states jointly move the believer, at least to some degree, to act so as to keep the promise.
Certain virtue theorists offer a quite refined version of the latter idea, arguing that only a particular type of moral belief—one tied to an ideal or complete conception of a situation in light of a more expansive understanding of how to live—necessarily generates in an individual the motivation to do as a moral belief of that type indicates she ought Little ; McDowell The virtuous person has not mere moral beliefs but a complex of moral belief and outlook which will reliably move her to behave morally.
Proponents of various anti-Humean views readily acknowledge that persons often fail to be moved and to act as they believe they ought. According to any of these views, however, a failure of motivation springs from a cognitive failure. As already noted, many have found the basic Humean picture most plausible. Before examining a few of the considerations thought to favor it, we should make note of the fact that Humeanism does not itself commit one to any particular view as to the sorts of desires responsible for moral motivation.
A Humean might well take the view that no particular desire is implicated in moral motivation. On the contrary, varying desires may, when contingently present, move an individual to do what she judges she ought to do, including the desire to be well regarded by her neighbors, to advance her interests in some way, or to promote the welfare of those who matter to her.
Appealing simply to some contingent desire or other may be inadequate, however, to explain the basic phenomenon of moral motivation. After all, what needs to be explained, many would argue, is not merely how we may, on occasion or even frequently, be motivated to do as we think we ought: That includes explaining why motivation reliably shifts so as to track changes in our moral beliefs.
As we will see, those who accept the Humean picture have sometimes suggested that we look to quite particular desires or to deep features of human psychology to explain moral motivation. One argument in favor of the Humean picture alleges that if beliefs were sufficient to motivate, then we would expect people with the same beliefs to be motivated in the same way. In fact, however, whereas some people are motivated by their moral belief, say, that contributing to famine relief is a duty, to write a check to Oxfam, others feel no such inclination whatsoever.
But anti-Humeans claim that they can explain away these differences by showing either that differential motivation is in fact due to other differences in belief or to motives that compete with and override the desires generated by moral beliefs Shafer-Landau— A second argument in favor of Humeanism appeals to the view about reasons associated with Williamsbriefly discussed earlier. Recall that according to internalism about reasons or reasons internalism, it is necessarily the case that if an individual has a reason to do an action, then he must be able to be motivated to do that action.
On a more specific version of the view, an individual has a reason to do an action only if he has a desire to perform that action or to achieve some end that requires doing that action. If internalism about reasons is correct, then when an individual correctly judges himself to have a reason to perform an action, he must already have a preexisting desire. Anti-Humeans sometimes reject reasons internalism, as well as the Humean theory of motivation.
But even allowing that reasons internalism is correct, they believe this second argument fails to undermine their position.
For it seems possible that not all of our moral judgments involve the judgment correct or otherwise that we have a reason for action. An individual could, for example, judge that it would be right to fulfill a promise without judging that she has a reason to do anything. What might explain this? Perhaps, for instance, she fails to reflect on the connection between what it is right to do and what one has reason to do; or perhaps she mistakenly believes that truths about morally right action do not entail truths about what one has reason to do.
They differ in such a way, it would seem, that belief states cannot entail desire states. Whereas beliefs aim to fit the world, desires aim to change the world. For a mental state to count as a belief, it must be at least somewhat responsive to evidence that bears on the truth or falsity of its propositional content; that the facts are contrary to a belief counts against it.
In contrast, facts contrary to the propositional content of a desire—the fact that the world is not currently as one wants—need not count against that desire.
Precisely because desires aim not to answer to the world but to make the world answer to them to make the world fit their propositional contents or what the desires are desires forthey may well persist even when the world refuses to cooperate.
Assuming the foregoing claims about belief and desire are true, so the argument goes, at least some versions of anti-Humeanism would require what is incoherent, namely, mental states with incompatible directions of fit: But anti-Humeans would argue that their picture of moral motivation via moral belief need involve no incoherence. To see this, we need merely consider the possibility that a mental state could have opposing directions of fit so long as in exhibiting each direction of fit, the mental state was directed at different propositions: On the negative side, they attempt to defeat considerations thought to favor the Humean theory, as we have already seen in the course of exploring some of those considerations.
On the positive side, Anti-Humeans sometimes appeal to the phenomenology of moral motivation, arguing that it supports their view. Ask the agent who is sorely tempted to do otherwise why he ultimately acted as he believed morality required and he will not report his desires at the moment of action; rather, he will explain that he believed the action was the right thing to do Shafer-Landau Our own experience and that of others tells us that although our actions often arise from our desires, sometimes they arise instead from our evaluative beliefs.
As further support for these claims about the phenomenology of moral motivation, Shafer-Landau has appealed to nonmoral cases in which motivation seems to follow from belief. Consider the individual who convinces herself that she has a desire she in fact lacks, such as the desire to become a lawyer.
She enrolls in law school only to find herself unmotivated by her coursework and dropping out of school, after a summer spent working as a carpenter reveals her love of carpentry Shafer-Landau Given that many of our choices will involve subjecting ourselves to tedious, even painful, experiences—experiences that surely none of us desire for their own sake—the Humean owes us some explanation of our willingness to persist in such choices. The Humean will, it seems, be forced to appeal to some further desire we thereby seek to satisfy, such as, in the case of the law school drop-out, the desire to become a lawyer.
But such an explanation will be implausible in cases in which we are mistaken about our desires. No compelling reason can be given to accept a desire-based explanation of our actions, Shafer-Landau argues, over the more straightforward explanation in terms of our beliefs.
Leaving that argument to one side, however, neither the phenomenology of moral motivation nor cases in which individuals are mistaken about their desires support the anti-Humean view. The fact that an individual may cite a belief rather than a desire in explaining why she did what she judged to be right does nothing to show either that her moral belief directly moved her to act or that it generated a desire that moved her to act.
Individual self-reports are notoriously unreliable and can hardly settle so fundamental a question about moral psychology. As for cases in which individuals are allegedly mistaken about their desires, common sense suggests that the Humean has the more straightforward explanation. Once she experienced it, she lost her desire to continue her studies.
Still, she was moved to enter law school not by her bare belief, but by a more deep seated, perhaps not fully conscious desire, such as the desire to please her parents or to have the prestige or pay that comes with being a lawyer. Anti-Humeans have given us no reason to favor their explanation over the Humean alternatives.
Of course, anti-Humeans need not think the phenomenology, as they suppose it to be, settles the dispute, but Humeans will insist that it does not even tend to favor the anti-Humean position. The foregoing discussion does not, of course, cover every argument that has been offered in the longstanding debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans, just a few of the ones that philosophers have evidently found most persuasive.
Whether and how the debate might be resolved remains uncertain, in part, because the nature of the dispute is rather unclear. Is it at bottom a conceptual dispute to be resolved, for instance, by analysis of the concepts of belief and desire?
Perhaps, though arguments that appeal to considerations in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology have thus far proved less than fully convincing.
Is the dispute instead fundamentally empirical? The tendency to appeal to common sense and the phenomenology of moral action would seem to betray some temptation to treat the issue as at least partly empirical, though perhaps these appeals are meant to serve merely as a check on conceptual claims. Appeals to our experience can, in any case, be just as well, and just as inconclusively, invoked by those on either side of the debate.
In the context of warding off criticisms of the view that virtue is knowledge, Little suggests that the dispute is fundamentally theoretical, implicating large and complex questions about the nature of agency, normativity, and responsibility. Whether or not that is so, Little may be right in suggesting that the dispute will not be resolvable by appeal to merely local arguments of the sort we have considered.
How plausible one finds either side may turn, in the end, on the plausibility of the larger theories in which these views respectively figure.
Externalism Whatever one might conclude as to whether moral judgments or beliefs motivate on their own or only by means of some preexisting conative state, a question remains as to the precise nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation. Do moral judgments motivate necessarily or do they motivate only contingently? If the latter, then how are we to explain why the contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation is as strong and reliable as it appears to be?
The main division of opinion regarding the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation is between those philosophers who accept and those who reject a thesis known as motivational judgment internalism. This thesis is a form of judgment internalism. As currently characterized in the literature, judgment internalism makes the conceptual claim that a necessary connection exists between sincere moral judgment and either justifying reasons or motives: Judgment internalism must be distinguished from the thesis of existence internalism, which we considered earlier.
Recall that according to existence internalism, a necessary connection exists between having a certain normative status and motivation. Whereas judgment internalism states a necessary condition on being a judgment of a certain kind, existence internalism states a necessary condition on being an act or state or consideration of a certain normative kind. Internalism can assume weaker or stronger forms.
Thus, what objective moral properties must be like involves a rather extreme form of existence internalism, which would be allied with a rather extreme form of judgment internalism.
Contemporary moral philosophers have been no more attracted to so strong a claim when moral motivation is tied to moral judgment than they have been when moral motivation is tied to moral properties. Instead, they have accepted weaker forms of internalism, which allow that even though, necessarily, the person who makes a sincere moral judgment will feel some motivation to comply with it, that motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires and defeated by a variety of mental maladies, such as depression and weakness of will Svavarsdottirsec.
As should already be evident, those who accept one or another form of motivational judgment internalism have a ready explanation of the reliability of moral motivation, including the reliability of motivational shifting so as to track changes in moral judgment. Indeed, one argument offered in favor of internalism is that only if we accept it can we plausibly explain why changes in moral motivation reliably follow upon changes in moral judgment Smith71— Suppose Jones and Thomson are debating the moral permissibility of abortion.
Jones is inclined to believe that abortion is morally wrong. She has been known to join the protest line outside of a local abortion clinic and to try to dissuade women from having abortions. Thomson, in contrast, believes that abortion is morally permissible. Suppose that after extensive discussion, Thomson convinces Jones that the more plausible arguments support the permissibility of abortion. They would reasonably predict, among other things, that she would no longer be inclined to join the protest line and that she would desist from her efforts to discourage other women from having abortions.
But that prediction rests precisely on the expectation that, at least insofar as Jones is a good and strong-willed person—not depressed or apathetic or suffering from weakness of will—what she is motivated to do will have been altered in response to the change in her moral judgment, which is just what internalism would lead us to expect. If internalism is true, then, we can readily account for motivational changes. The reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation is, ultimately, best explained internally as due to the very content or nature of moral judgment itself Smith Those who accept internalism will, of course, ultimately owe us an account of the nature of moral judgments that explains and captures the necessary connection that supposedly exists between moral judgment and motivation.
According to externalism, any connection that exists between moral judgment and motivation is purely contingent, though it may turn out to rest on deep features of human nature. The foregoing argument in favor of internalism in effect denies that externalism can adequately explain the basic phenomenon of moral motivation and, in particular, the seemingly reliable shifting of moral motivation to match changes in moral judgment.
But why think externalism will be explanatorily inadequate? Once we have the internalist thesis about the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, it seems we have, as it were, the whole story: Because the externalist denies the existence of a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, the externalist thesis leaves us in need of an independent explanation of moral motivation.
But this allegedly commits the externalist to an unacceptable picture of moral motivation. The internalist will say that an agent who is moved to do the right thing is moved to do the very thing that is given by the content of her moral judgment; she is motivated to do the very thing she judges to be right In contrast, the externalist must say that an agent is moved to do what she judges right due to the content of the motivational dispositions that she has in being a good person.
The question then is what those dispositions might be. If such motivational shifting is to be explained in terms of the motivational dispositions of the good person, rather than in terms of the content of her moral judgments, then the only disposition that could do the explaining would be the motivation to do the right thing, whatever it happens to be But the good person, Smith claims, cares non-derivatively about justice, equality, and the welfare of loved ones.
Externalists have responded to this challenge by pointing out that the fact that a good person is motivated to do what she thinks right does not preclude her from also being motivated non-derivately by direct concern, for example, for the welfare of loved ones. They have also argued that there is nothing fetishistic in supposing that the good person is motivationally disposed to do the right thing and that, in any case, alternative externalist explanations of a reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation are available Copp49— An individual could, for example, simply be disposed to desire immediately to do whatever she believes it right to do or whatever she judges to be valuable, rather than being disposed to do the right thing, whatever it turns out to be Copp50— We should, on her view, understand the good person as concerned with doing what is morally valuable or required, where that concern should be understood to encompass what is honest, fair, kind, considerate, just, and so on.
The fact that the good person is so motivationally disposed does not mean, as Smith seems to suggest, that she cares only about one thing, namely, doing what she believes is right.
Nor does it mean that she undertakes an act conceiving of it simply as the right thing to do.
Moral Motivation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Finally, Svavarsdottir argues that although a desire to do the morally right action, say, aid another in need, may derive at first from a desire to be moral, it may come to operate independently of the latter desire, so that her desire to aid is not simply an instrumental desire Svavarsdottir—, — Various efforts have been made to respond to the problem of the amoralist, and these efforts have led to the development of numerous versions of motivational judgment internalism.
Generally, internalists have insisted that the amoralist is a conceptual impossibility. The standard strategy internalists employ to cope with the hypothetical amoralist is to identify a content for moral judgments which would have the result that no agent or no rational agent, anyway could employ moral concepts competently and make a sincere moral judgment, while remaining unmoved.
Internalists allow that moral motivation need not be overriding; competing desires may be stronger and so may win out. Cases of irrationality aside, however, the person who appears to be making a moral judgment, while remaining unmoved, must really either lack competence with moral concepts or be speaking insincerely.
Externalists, of course, maintain that the amoralist is not a conceptual impossibility. After all, if we can conceive of amoralists, as we surely can, then they are not conceptually impossible Shafer-Landau ,